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Recent Developments

Park Station Limited Partnership, LLLP v. Bosse:
A Gift of Land Is Not a Sale Triggering a Right of First Refusal and Rights of
First Refusal Do Not Violate the Rule Against Perpetuities
By: Darren Cooper

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held a gift of
land is not a sale triggering a right of
first refusal and rights of first refusal
do not violate the Rule Against
Perpetuities (RAP). Park Station
Ltd. P'ship, LLLP v. Bosse, 378
Md. 122,835 A.2d 646 (2003). In
so holding, the court determined a
collateral benefit received from a gift
will not transform the conveyance
into a sale and interests in property
vesting during a party's lifetime do not
violate the RAP. Id.
James and Lois Bosse (Bosse)
owned, in fee simple, a rectangular
parcel of land in Anne Arundel
County. Park Station Limited
Partnership, LLLP (Park) owned, in
fee simple, a parcel ofland SlllTOunding
Bosse's parcel on three sides. In
1986, the parties entered into a
contract for reciprocal easements,
which granted Park rights of first
refusal in the event Bosse wished to
sell the parcel. Bosse was required
to give Park written notice of a desire
to sell and the sale price and terms.
Park was required to accept or rej ect
the terms within thirty days or Bosse
was free to sell the property to others.
In 2001, Bosse created a
religious foundation, Jehovah-Jireh,
and decided to gift the parcel to them,
which would result in a tax deduction.
Bosse informed Park that the transfer
was a gift without consideration.

Park contended the right of first
refusal applied because the transfer
was a sale. Bosse filed for a
declaratory judgment in the Circuit
Court for Anne Arundel County
alleging the land transfer was not
within the right of first refusal and the
rightoffirstrefusal violated the RAP.
Both parties filed motions for summary
judgment. The circuit court declared
the gift was not a sale within the right
offirst refusal and rights offirst refusal
do not violate the RAP. Park and
Bosse appealed to the Court of
Special Appeals ofMaryland, but the
Court ofAppeals of Maryland granted certiorari on its own motion before
the case was heard.
The court began its analysis by
dissecting Park's unsupported
argument that the transfer ofproperty
was a sale rather than a gift. Id. at
128, 835 A.2d at 650. The court
looked to its Eastern Shore Trust Co.
v. Lockerman, 148 Md. 628, 636,
129 A.2d 915, 918 (1915)
interpretation ofthe plain meaning of
"sale," which defined "sale" as
transferring to another, for valuable
consideration, the title or right to
possess property. Id. at 129, 835
A.2d at 650.
Fifty years after Eastern Shore,
the court defined a "sale" involving a
rightoffirstrefusal. Id., 835 A.2d at
651 (citing Straley v. Osborne, 262
Md. 514, 526, 278 A.2d 64, 71

(1971». Relying on Eastern Shore,
the Straley court held a transfer of
property to a corporation without
consideration was not a sale, did not
violate any right of first refusal held
by the corporation, and was a gift.
Jd. at 130, 835 A.2d at 651.
The court next analyzed whether
Bosse's tax benefit constituted
consideration, making the transfer a
sale rather than a gift. Id. For a
transfer to be a sale, consideration
received must be intended to serve
as consideration for the transfer. Jd.
For the transfer to be a gift, there
must be intent to transfer property,
donor delivery, donee acceptance,
and 'no compensation for the transfer.
Id. at 131, 835 A.2d at 651-52.
Therefore, a collateral benefit to a
donor, such as a tax benefit, has an
altogether different purpose than
intended and is not sufficient to make
the transfer a sale. Id. at 130,835
A.2d at 651. As a result, the court
concluded Bosse received no
consideration from the proposed
transfer of property to JehovahJireh. Id. at 131-32, 835 A.2d at
652. The court found all elements of
a gift present and the transfer was not
a sale implicating the right of first
refusal. Jd.
The court next addressed
Bosse's cross-appeal that alleged the
right offirst refusal violated the RAP.
Id. Maryland retains the common-
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law definition of the RAP that "no
interest is good unless it must vest, if
at all, not later than twenty-one years
after some life in being at the creation
ofthe interest." Id. Although the RAP
generally does not apply to contracts,
a contract that creates an equitable
right in real property, such as a right
of first refusal, subjects the contract
to the RAP. Id. at 134,835 A.2d at
653.
The court of appeals stated that
the right offirst refusal did not include
Bosse's successors or assigns. Id.
Since the right of first refusal applied
only to the Bosses, the right vested
when the Bosses sold the property or
was extinguished upon their deaths.
Id. Therefore, the right offirst refusal
did not violate the RAP. Id. at 135,
835 A.2d at 654. The court reinforced its conclusion by applying a
principle held in several other
jurisdictions that addresses rights of
first refusal. Id. at 137, 835 A.2d at
655. The principle states rights of
first refusal are presumed personal and
not transferable or assignable unless
the contract granting the right of first
refusal clearly refers, grants, or intends
such a right to successors or assigns.
Id. The principle was reiterated in
Vogel v. Melish, 203 N .E.2d 411,
412-14 (1964), holding it
unreasonable to assume parties intend
rights of first refusal to survive the
death of a party when no provision
for the right is made in the agreement.
Id. Therefore, the court held a right
of first refusal does not violate the
RAP. Id. at 138, 835 A.2d at 656.
The Park decision is a significant
effort to solidify several principles
associated with land transfers - rights
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of first refusal and contract
construction. The Park holding
redefines the proper and fair
methodology of interpreting
potentially ambiguous language.
Further, Park is important to
Maryland landowners who may
attempt to protect potential future land
interests with rights offirst refusal. As
clearly enunciated in this case, a
landowner with a right offirst refusal
must be aware that those rights may
be impeded if the contract is not
properly crafted to include all potential
transfers, including gifts.
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